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The psychologization of Humanitarian aid. Skimming the bat-
tlefield and the disaster zone. 
Abstract  
 
Humanitarian aid‖s psycho-therapeutic turn in the 1990s was mirrored by the in-
creasing emotionalisation and subjectivation of fundraising campaigns. In order 
to grasp the depth of this interconnectedness, this paper argues that in both cases 
what we see is the post-Fordist production paradigm at work; namely, as Hardt & 
Negri put it, the direct production of subjectivity and social relations. To explore 
this, the therapeutic and mental health approach in humanitarian aid is juxta-
posed with the more general phenomenon of psychologization. This allows us to 
see that the psychologized production of subjectivity has a problematic waste-
product as it reduces the human to homo sacer, to use Giorgi Agamben‖s term. 
Drawing out a double matrix of a de-psychologizing psychologization connected 
to a politicizing de-politicization, it will further become possible to understand 
psycho-therapeutic humanitarianism as a case of how, in these times of globalisa-
tion, psychology, subjectivity and money are all interrelated.  
Introduction 
In January 2010 Haiti was hit by a devastating earthquake. Already on day three a hu-
manitarian NGO was providing children with pencils and paper to let them come to 
terms with their bereavement and fears. In humanitarian aid the psychosocial dimen-
sion has become essential. For the Red Cross, to take one example, psychological sup-
port is not a speciality but is integrated into all activities; even first aiders are trained to 
“treat the wounded, not only the wound.”1 Beyond the food, shelter and bandages, the 
surplus of the wound, the human, is taken care of. This psychosocial dimension takes 
centre stage in the ―developed‖, Western countries too. The ―imploring eyes‖ of the Afri-
                                                     
 
 
1 IFRC, Psychological Support: Best Practices from Red Cross and Red Crescent Programmes (Geneva: International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2001), 8. 
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can Child are the obvious example of how potential donors are interpellated as subjec-
tive-emotional beings. However, at another level subjectivity seems to be the end-goal 
and not only the means to make people donate. Already in 1993 Moore remarked how in 
charity the “feelgood factor” had come to replace compassion.2 Consider for example 
the yearly Red Cross fundraising campaign Music For Life – also called Het Glazen House 
(the Glass House) – run by the Flemish radio station Studio Brussels (similar to Serious 
Request of the Dutch radio station 3FM). Three popular DJ‖s live for five days in a kind of 
glass house, mimicking circumstances in the South as they subject themselves to pseu-
do-starving and life on a limited ration of ―smoothies‖. In the square in front of the glass 
house, a crowd gathers to sing, to dance and to support them. Money is raised by selling 
music requests. After days the DJ‖s are led to a stage accompanied by loud cheering and 
camera flashes. As the TV reporters probe their psycho-emotional status, tears flow. The 
end goal is thus not only the cardboard cheque unveiled by the selected dignitary but, 
foremost, it is the production of emotions and good feelings. In other words, the aim is 
the production of the surplus of subjectivity. In this way, the fundraising event mirrors 
the rise of the psychosocial in humanitarian aid, with its emphasis on individual and 
psychological aspects of the human condition. To truly grasp this interconnectedness, 
this paper will argue that in both cases what we are seeing is the post-Fordist produc-
tion paradigm at work, the direct production of subjectivity and social relations.3 To 
explore this thesis, I will juxtapose the therapeutic and mental health approach of hu-
manitarianism with the more general phenomenon of psychologization. This will allow 
us to see that the psychologized production of subjectivity has a problematic waste-
product, insofar as it reduces the human to homo sacer, to use Giorgi Agamben‖s term.4 In 
this way it will become clear how, as the Glass House event already showed, in these 
times of globalisation psychology, subjectivity and money are interrelated. To introduce 
this psycho-economics, let us first turn to what generally is regarded as the origin of the 
psychotherapeutic turn in humanitarianism. 
                                                     
 
 
2 As glossed by: E. Burman, "Innocents Abroad: Western Fantasies of Childhood and the Iconography of 
Emergencies," Disasters 18, no. 3 (1994). 
3 M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire. 
4 G. Agamben, Homo sacer. 
 The crisis in humanitarianism in the 1990s 
The psychotherapeutic turn in humanitarian aid is commonly situated in the 1990s. 
Vannesa Pupavac, for example, contends that trauma eclipsed hunger in the 1990s as 
the issue most flagged by international aid agencies.5 The first time Médicins Sans Fron-
tières (MSF), for example, involved psychiatrists and psychologists was in Armenia after 
the December 1988 earthquake. In subsequent MSF-projects in Palestine, mental health 
became one of the primary activities.6 For social anthropologist Didier Fassin (adminis-
trator of MSF in 1999-2001) the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was the first time in history 
that a humanitarian crisis was described in terms of subjectivity:  
Where previously the language evoked in defending oppressed peoples was that of 
revolution, current usage favors the vocabulary of psychology to sensitize the 
world to their misfortune. Yesterday we denounced imperialist domination; today 
we reveal its psychic traces. Not so long ago we glorified the resistance of popula-
tions; we henceforth scrutinize the resilience of individuals.7 
Pupavac understands this psychosocial turn in relation to crisis in which humanitarian-
ism found itself in the 1990s. The critique that aid undermines local economies, feeds 
the villains and fuels conflicts led to “a demoralized humanitarianism and a demoral-
ized humanitarian aid worker.”8 Mark Duffield looks at the crisis in humanitarianism 
from a Foucauldian-Agambian perspective. According to Duffield, biopolitics, the taking 
care of the health of populations, has become a global issue wherein global governance 
is “power over the life of populations conceived as existing globally rather than nation-
ally or territorially.”9 Jenny Edkins argues that in this way humanitarian interventions 
could not but be caught up in a “tightening of a global structure of authority and con-
trol.”10 Duffield discusses how NGO‖s had to realize that humanitarian aid is de facto en-
tangled with biopolitics. Drawing on Agamben, Duffield contends that the claimed neu-
trality of humanitarian projects could no longer be maintained as a comforting shield, 
but actually draws NGO‖s into biopolitics: 
                                                     
 
 
5 V. Pupavac, "War on the Couch: the emotionology of the new international security paradigm." 
6 Médecins sans Frontières, "Dossier Freud in the field," Messages 142(2006). 
7 D. Fassin, "The humanitarian politics of testimony. Subjectification through trauma in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict," Cultural Anthropology 23, no. 3 (2008): 532. 
8 V. Pupavac, "Psychosocial interventions and the demoralization of humanitarianism," 497. 
9 M. Duffield, Carry on killing: Global governance, humanitarianism and terror, vol. DIIS Working Paper 2004/23 
(Copenhagen: Danish institute for international studies, 2004), 6. 
10 J. Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2003), 212. 
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The insistence that humanitarianism is ―neutral‖ and separate from politics, means 
that humanitarians can only grasp human life as bare life. By excluding the politi-
cal, humanitarianism reproduces the isolation of bare life and hence the basis of 
sovereignty itself.11 
Duffield concludes, quoting Agamben, that despite the best intentions, humanitarians 
maintain “a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight” (Agamben, 1998). 
This radical interconnectedness and interpenetration of the new security terrain is at 
the heart of the crisis of humanitarianism.12  
But to answer the question as to why this crisis effected a paradigm shift which re-
sulted in the psycho-social becoming central to humanitarian aid, we must go beyond 
both Pupavac and Duffield. Let us turn to Pupavac first. She concurs that the psychoso-
cial turn can be understood as a response to the crisis in humanitarianism as it attempt-
ed to “bring back the human in the face of the bureaucratization of aid, foregrounding 
how people and communities personally experience disaster or conflict.”13 However, 
should we not understand this in biopolitical terms? One can argue that this attempt to 
escape the grip of biopolitics led exactly to psycho-politics as a yet more sophisticated 
form of biopolitics. It is crucial to see that global governance defines the scope of bio-
politics in areas and in ways which as a matter of course belong to the scope of the psy-
experts. This is how we can interpret Duffield‖s observation that direct territorial con-
trol based on juridical and bureaucratic authority is replaced by mutable and networked 
management and regulation of economic, political and social processes:  
People in the South are no longer ordered what to do—they are now expected to 
do it willingly themselves (emphasis original).14 
Psycho-politics is obviously the best way to accomplish these biopolitical goals. Placing 
the focus on self-reliance and sustainable development, the psycho-social dimension 
and thus psycho-social techniques necessarily enter the scene. However, here we have 
to go beyond Duffield‖s classic Foucauldian perspective, for, as it considers power pro-
cesses as dispersed and as lacking agency, it does not allow us to grasp the inequality 
between the South and the North and especially the latter‖s sovereign use of psycho-
political technologies (and the political-economical aspects of all this). Here Pupavac‖s 
argument that the psychosocial turn in humanitarian aid is related to Western society‖s 
own change in outlook is very helpful. She shows how the Western pathologization of 
                                                     
 
 
11 M. Duffield, Carry on killing: Global governance, humanitarianism and terror, DIIS Working Paper 2004/23: 13. 
12 Ibid., 16. 
13 V. Pupavac, "Psychosocial interventions and the demoralization of humanitarianism," 497. 
14 M. Duffield, Global governance and the new wars (London: Zed books, 2001), 34. 
 war, for example, is rooted in a wider psychologization affecting the West itself. Lacking 
strong convictions themselves, Pupavac writes, donor countries find it difficult to imag-
ine people believing in causes worth fighting for and thus declare populations at war as 
dysfunctional.15 Pupavac points to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent demise 
of ideological alternatives as the origin of this position. In conjunction with increasing 
social atomization, she argues that this led to a therapeutizing of public discourse which 
blurred the political with the therapeutic.16 The psychologization of the West thus 
seems to have led to the psychologization of the South. But, to fully grasp the intercon-
nectedness of these two processes, we have to engage in, not so much a biopolitical or a 
psycho-political understanding but, rather, in a truly psycho-economical approach. One 
could, after all, understand the psychologising of the South as an export of psychologi-
cal resources in order to realize a surplus. The crucial point here is to grapple with how 
subjectivity came to play a central role in late-capitalist modes of production. As exem-
plified by the Glass House fundraising event, psychologised humanitarianism reveals 
how today the tears, the emotions, the overflow of subjectivity, all constitute the sur-
plus-value to be economized and capitalized. But before we can engage fully in a psy-
cho-economical critique of psychologization, we have first to flesh out two central and 
interrelated paradoxes of the psychologization of humanitarian aid. The first paradox 
stems from the fact that one cannot not psychologise. The second from the fact that 
psychologization boils down to psycho-education. 
Psychologization and how you cannot not psychologise 
The first thing to notice is that the therapeutic turn, with its stress on trauma, did not 
solve the crisis in humanitarianism, with manifold critiques of psychologization and 
therapeutization emerging very quickly. Derek Summerfield, for example, argued in 
1997 that “the globalisation of western psychological concepts and practices risks per-
petuating the colonial status of the non-western mind.”17 Defenders of the trauma ap-
proach counter-argued that psychologists and psychiatrists are dealing with universal 
realities. Sound science and evidence-based research (e.g. on the Post Traumatic Stress 
Syndrome) are posited as transcending all cultural and anthropological differences.18 
                                                     
 
 
15 V. Pupavac, "Psychosocial interventions and the demoralization of humanitarianism." 
16 V. Pupavac, "War on the Couch: the emotionology of the new international security paradigm." 
17 D. Summerfield, "Legacy of war: beyond "trauma" to the social fabric," The Lancet 349, no. 9065 (1997): 1568. 
18 See for example F. de Vries, "To make a drama out of trauma is fully justified," The Lancet 351, no. 9115 
(1998). 
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But the remarkable thing is that when Summerfield answers this by arguing for the his-
toricity of diagnoses such as PTSD, he takes recourse to signifiers such as suffering, dis-
tress, problem-solving etc.,19 apparently assuming the validity of universal categories. His 
carefully chosen terms from everyday life (misery, distress...) betray the resolve to evade 
psychological language but they risk postulating a similar kind of universalization. In 
every critique of the psychologization of humanitarian aid, this danger of falling into 
yet another mode of psychologization is always immanent. Summerfield, for example, 
eventually ends his critique of the neo-colonial mindset with which he characterises the 
discourse of trauma with a plea for a “wiser and truer use of the term psychology.”20 
Similarly, Dag Nordanger argues against the “western trauma discourse” and advocates 
the acknowledgement of “local folk psychology.”21 For Pupavac the critique of trauma 
relief needs to acknowledge that the trauma programmes themselves raise issues; we 
could even say that the trauma programmes are themselves traumatic for those subjected 
to them: 
When all the psychological terms are stripped away, we appear to be left with in-
dividuals or communities‖ own responses being displaced or instrumentalised by 
outside professionals, informed by presumptions of the vulnerability, incapacity 
and irrational nature of recipient populations. (…) The very intrusion into the per-
sonal sphere may inadvertently corrode the sense of intimacy necessary for cohe-
sive family and community bonds, which are so important in mediating and over-
coming trauma. Since stress and anger can be a spur to action, psycho-social in-
tervention may disempower people in the long-term.22 
That is to say, through the critique, Pupavac cannot help but slip into psychological dis-
course, drawing as it does on the same language as the psychotherapeutic programmes 
themselves. Pupavac cannot but consider therapeutic governance to be detrimental to a 
population‖s mental health.23  
Even a return to the human rights approach to opposing therapeutic governance 
does not seem to be able to evade the paradox of therapeutizing. Inger Agger, for exam-
ple, endorses the opposition to therapeutic discourse from psychologists and psychia-
trists in exile from the military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina and supports their 
                                                     
 
 
19 D. Summerfield, ""Trauma" and the experience of war: a reply," The Lancet 351, no. 9115 (1998). 
20 D. Summerfield, "“My Whole Body is Sick … my Life is not Good”," in Forced Migration and Mental Health, ed. D. 
Ingleby, International and Cultural Psychology (New York: Springer US, 2005), 110. 
21 D. O. Nordanger, "Coping with Loss and Bereavement in Post-war Tigray, Ethiopia," Transcultural psychiatry 
44, no. 4 (2007): 558. 
22 V. Pupavac, Therapeutising refugees, pathologising populations: international psycho-social programmes in Kosovo, 
vol. Working paper No. 59, New issues in refugee research (UNHCR, 2002), 3-4. 
23 V. Pupavac, "War on the Couch: the emotionology of the new international security paradigm," 164. 
 claim that people do not suffer from mental illness or PTSD, but that they are “suffering 
from the dictatorship.”24 However, not only do signifiers such as “treatment,” “coping 
strategies” and “healing” still pop up in Agger‖s discourse but, moreover, the only shift 
proposed seems to be a turn from psychotherapy to socio-therapy. Here Agger endorses 
the Red Cross‖s policy of making a “shift from a trauma approach to a community-based 
approach,” focusing “on healing through already existing cultural and spiritual belief sys-
tems.”25 But what is gained by trading the psycho-engineer for the socio-engineer who 
promotes “natural support networks” and “coping strategies”? Ultimately, what we can 
discern here is the same Olympian vantage point from which the academically informed 
promote the cultural approach as the least traumatic and beneficial. Eventually, this alleg-
edly more sophisticated access to the universal and “real” problems, paradoxically boils 
down to bypassing all socio-cultural dimensions.  
Consider for example Agger‖s plea to build on “local cultural resources such as tradi-
tions, and human resources such as traditional healers, elders, women groups, teachers, 
and key people within religious communities.”26 She cites Wessels for whom it is sadly 
often local people themselves who view their own approaches as inferior, believing that 
the modern, Western methods are better: “This deeply ingrained sense of inferiority is 
one of the worst residues of colonialism and is itself a major form of psychological dam-
age.”27 On the contrary, to put it bluntly, is not this let them have their dances and voodoo-
rituals the ultimate residue of colonialism as it places us, sophisticated Westerners, once 
again in the superior position of being able to judge? Wessells and others end up taking 
the ultimate meta-perspective, a meta-psychologizing one, where they criticize the lo-
cals‖ inferiority complex and assume to assess the real psychological damage caused by 
their breaking with traditions. Here the question to ask is whether this ethnographic 
God‖s eye view, which places “culture at the centre in any type of psychosocial assis-
tance,”28 risks endorsing precisely the oppressive conservative currents evident in local 
societies (the traditional healers, the religious communities…)? Is it perhaps the case 
that they feel that the more progressive and truly political movements will not be the 
ideal partners? Here of course the deadlocks rapidly present themselves. What if these 
traditional “local cultural agencies” turn out to repress women, children and homosex-
uals? I will return to these problematic political entanglements below, but first I will 
                                                     
 
 
24 I. Agger and S. B. Jensen, Trauma and healing under state terrorism (London: Zed Books, 1996), 70. 
25 I. Agger, "Therapeutic approaches to the treatment of refugees – A historical perspective," (2002): 17. 
26 Ibid., 18. 
27 M. Wessells, "Culture, power, and community: Intercultural approaches to psychosocial assistance and 
healing," in Honoring differences: Cultural issues in the treatment of trauma and loss, ed. K. Nader, N. Dubrow, and B. 
Stamm (Philadelphia, PA: Brunner/Mazel, 1999), 276. 
28 I. Agger, "Therapeutic approaches to the treatment of refugees – A historical perspective," 18. 
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turn to the second paradox of psychologization evident in psycho-social humanitarian 
aid, the paradox of psychologization as psycho-education. 
Psychologization is psycho-education 
The paradox that critiques of psychologization cannot avoid ending up psychologising 
can perhaps be tied to the fact that the processes of psychologization are already are, 
paradoxically, de-psychologizing.29 Just consider how the hegemony of neuro-organic 
models have turned the psychological into a non-category in both the theories and the 
praxes of mainstream psychology. For mainstream psychology, the psyche is but the 
function of chemical substances and brain waves. In this way, psychologists themselves, 
wittingly or not, promote de-psychologization. But even where there is more distance 
towards the neurochemical perspective – where there are, for example, attempts to ac-
count for the psychological in terms of cognition or behavioural and evolutionary pat-
terns – even there it is hard to discern a true subjective or properly psychic dimension. 
Is psychology as a science not by definition bound to end up with the human being be-
ing reduced to an automaton governed by forces from which it itself is exempt? Re-
duced to either neuronal or behavioural laws, the psychologised subject in the end re-
mains de-subjectivized and, thus, also de-psychologized. Psychology appears unable to 
account for this paradox of non-subjectivity. This is why the critiques of psychology are, 
more often than not, paralysed by the same deadlock. In their attempts to safeguard the 
dimension of subjectivity, they are bound to end up in the same psychologising/de-
psychologizing stance that they criticize.  
The fact that the psychological and subjective dimension is a central problematic in 
today‖s scientific field is nowhere as evident as it is in the idea of “psychological first-
aid” in trauma relief. Definitions of what this “psychological first-aid” would mean, 
rarely get much further than the idea of getting people to talk. Psychological first-aid 
encompasses foremost forms of help or support which can hardly really be called psy-
chological at all, such as providing information and securing basic needs.30 Here it is 
                                                     
 
 
29 This is almost mathematics; wanting to de-psychology what is actually already de-psychologization, one 
cannot but engage in psychologising. 
30 “Psychological first aid: whether among the general population or among aid workers, acute distress follow-
ing exposure to traumatic stressors is best managed following the principles of psychological first aid. This 
entails basic, non-intrusive pragmatic care with a focus on listening but not forcing talk; assessing needs and 
ensuring that basic needs are met; encouraging but not forcing company from significant others; and protect-
ing from further harm. This type of first aid can be taught quickly to both volunteers and professionals. Health 
 clear that the fact that the psychological is effectively a non-category turns psychologi-
cal aid into a logical impossibility. The most common attempt to evade and negate this 
impasse, it could be argued, is by turning psychological aid into psycho-education. Con-
sider for example how Jones, Greenberg & Wessely plead that “large-scale community 
outreach and psycho-education about post-disaster reactions should be included among 
public health interventions to promote calming.”31 So while the wound can be treated 
directly, the treatment of the wounded has to pass through knowledge-distribution and 
education. This also is the main tenet in a Red Cross “good practices” report:  
The Colombian Red Cross set up a radio programme following a natural disaster to 
teach people about the psychological aspects of disasters. This method proved 
useful in terms of disseminating information related to the disaster, developing 
understanding, and reaching out to target groups. In general, teaching survivors 
to understand the psychological mechanisms behind their worries and difficulties 
helps them to cope with their feelings.32 
In other words, psychological first aid is basically the practice of teaching psychological 
theories to the target population. This is effected variously through the use of audiovis-
ual media as well as the distribution of what are referred to as patients leaflets. In the fol-
lowing quotation from such a leaflet it is clear that what is expected from the survivor is 
a theoretical understanding; the internalisation of the psychological theory is supposed 
to be healing: 
A talking treatment called cognitive behaviour therapy can help people who have 
PTSD. This kind of therapy is a short, practical treatment. It focuses on helping 
you understand your thoughts and feelings, and find practical ways of coping with 
them. You'll probably be offered around 10 sessions lasting an hour or so, with 
more sessions if you need them.33 
Psychological first-aid thus manifests, remarkably, as the administration of psychology 
itself. In this way certain characteristics of psychosocial aid can be understood as the 
typical strategies for attaining educational compliance. The Red Cross guidelines for 
psychosocial humanitarian aid at times even read like a propaganda manuals, complete 
with newspeak. It is, for example, recommended to sometimes call a psychosocial centre 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
workers are cautioned to avoid widespread prescription of benzodiazepines because of the risk of depend-
ence” (The Sphere Project, The Sphere Project. Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response 
(Oxford: Oxfam publishing, 2004), 293. 
31 N. Jones, N. Greenberg, and S. Wessely, "No plans survive first contact with the enemy: Flexibility and 
improvisation in disaster mental health," Psychiatry 70, no. 4 (2007): 362. 
32 IFRC, Psychological Support: Best Practices from Red Cross and Red Crescent Programmes: 6. 
33 BMJ, "Patient leaflet: post traumatic stress disorder," (2010). 
 11 
 
an information centre, as was done in Macedonia were people felt resistance against the 
psycho-social discourse.34 Where a Danish project in Bosnia & Herzegovinia served food 
to the children during workshops, the report, rather bluntly, states: “[e]ating highly 
nutritional food together forms part of the children‖s social activities.”35 The ghost of 
Pavlov seems to hover here. Pleasurable activities such as excursions and expressive 
activities such as singing, dancing, and drawing are also seen as ideal vehicles for the 
psycho-educational discourse: This sing, dance, draw, cope and enjoy-discourse – which is 
not only reserved for children but also implemented with adults – is extremely patron-
ising, reducing, as it does, the social to a de-politicised, schoolified, if not outright infan-
tilised, event.  
Psychosocial humanitarian aid is thus not only about handling and manipulating sub-
jectivity from an expert-academic position, it is also about establishing the discursive 
matrix of psycho-education to which the target population must comply. A surgeon or a 
physiotherapist primarily implements techniques or uses chemical substances to influ-
ence bodily processes. The patient can be completely oblivious of the theory behind 
these practices. This scheme cannot be transferred to psychology, as there the tech-
niques are invariably applied by introducing the patient to the background knowledge. 
Psychology seems thus to work via psychologization. A trauma-patient has to be briefed; 
you have experienced a shocking event and these are your symptoms. In this way, together 
with the appropriate signifiers, normative models of subjectivity are introduced. This 
psycho-educational praxis results, as Erica Burman puts is, in a technology of emotional 
regulation “that normalises and circumscribes emotional expression in the very act of 
„giving voice‟ to it.”36 Help thus manifests as the administration of normalising theories. 
The American Psychological Association, for example, describes the task of the psy-
chologist at the site of a disaster as to help survivors to “understand how common what 
they‖re [sic] feeling is, whether it‖s anger, sadness or other strong emotions,” and to 
“educate people that it is normal for disaster survivors to have an array of common re-
actions.”37 Central to psycho-education is, therefore, the transfer of what the academic 
perspective deems common, the norm.  
But besides the imposition of a rather limited set of normativizing and normalising 
signifiers, the most important thing here is to understand the discursive positions in 
play. As aid becomes education, the beneficiaries are put in the position of pupils. They 
                                                     
 
 
34 IFRC, Psychological Support: Best Practices from Red Cross and Red Crescent Programmes: 7. 
35 Ibid., 40-41. 
36 E. Burman, "Emotions and reflexivity in feminised education action research," Educational Action Research 14, 
no. 3 (2006): 325. 
37 APA, "What do psychologists do at disaster sites?," (2010). 
 have to adopt an academic gaze with regard to themselves and their situation.38 It is 
perhaps this that authors like Dider Fassin miss when they argue that the psycho-social 
discourse in humanitarian aid only produces a “particular form of subjectivation” 
through which the beneficiaries can also exist politically.39 This misses the fact that psy-
chologization is not just another set of signifiers which the oppressed can creatively use 
to seek subjectivation and politicization. It is clear that any creative and political at-
tempt to escape psychologising discourse will be easily re-inscribed in the psycho-social 
hegemonic framework. Every political stance will be re-translated in terms of, for ex-
ample, trauma and coping mechanisms. Moreover, in this virtual and neverending ap-
propriation of subjectivity the psychological discourse decisively reassigns the posi-
tions; the particular forms of subjectivation will inevitably be forced into the pre-
formatted discursive frame of psycho-education. The model of “what you experience” is 
strongly interpellative: even where “psychological distress” is granted culture-specific 
dimensions, this is only so against the background of a presupposed universal dimen-
sion. In being asked to behold oneself as the universal psychological human being, the 
subjective and political dimension Fassin wants to safeguard will again and again be ap-
propriated by the theoretical and academic perspective. Are we thus to conclude une-
quivocally that psychologization serves a de-politization? Maybe things are a bit more 
complex. Just as one cannot not psychologise, perhaps it is also true that one cannot not 
de-politicize. 
The politics of psycho-social humanitarianism: you cannot not de-politicize  
Let us start with the idea that psychologization equals de-psychologization. This is dis-
cernable in the trauma approach which pathologises war itself. Postulating cycles of vio-
lence, war is explained as resulting from earlier, undealt with trauma. Without the right 
treatment, the victims of war remain vengeful because of their “traumatisation”.40 
                                                     
 
 
38 It is only here that the quite enigmatic and paradoxical advice of the Los Angeles County Department of 
Mental Health becomes understandable; “continue to educate yourself and family about normal reactions to a 
disaster” (Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, 1995-2010). Once you have adopted the psycho-
logical gaze, you have become your own psychologist and thus you can only do what psychologists do; edu-
cate. Thus educate yourself and be your own psychology teacher. 
39 D. Fassin, "The humanitarian politics of testimony. Subjectification through trauma in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict." 
40 D. Summerfield, "Effects of war: moral knowledge, revenge, reconciliation, and medicalised concepts of" 
recovery"," BMJ. British medical journal (Clinical research ed.) 325, no. 7372 (2002): 1105. 
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Therapy can then be said to actually prompt the victim to overcome the psychology of 
traumatisation. That is to say, the psycho-educational approach aims to pull someone 
out of his/her own psychology, drawing him or her into the observational position of 
the psychological gaze. Becoming your own psychologist enables you to control your 
own psychology, enables you to de-psychologise. What the pathologization of war 
shows us is that it is exactly where it compromises the psychological-subjective dimen-
sion that war and violence are de-politicized. Psychologization is de-politicization inso-
far as it de-psychologises.  
But of course, if one cannot not psychologise, equally cannot not de-politicize. That is, 
de-politicization cannot but, in itself, be a political stance. This brings us back to Duf-
field‖s argument that it was in the crisis of humanitarianism that the politicisation of 
humanitarian assistance came to the surface.41 For Duffield, globalisation led to, on the 
one hand, complex forms of economic and political integration within the main bloc 
areas, and on the other hand, ethnocentric or fundamentalist assertions or breakdowns 
outside the borders of the main bloc. It was in those crisis regions that, in contrast to 
former direct inter-governmental aid, humanitarian assistance became the West‖s fa-
voured response.42 This led to an increased role for Western NGOs and allowed aid policy 
“to reassert a form of sovereignty within the crisis regions.”43 This means that there are 
two levels of politicisation to be discerned. First, there is the politicisation of the NGOs 
which have become subcontracters within the machine of the donor governments. Duf-
field points, in this respect, to the dependence of NGOs on military protection and logis-
tics (transport or large-scale commodity handling). Secondly, humanitarian aid is also 
involved in politicization on the level of the so-called failed or weak states themselves. 
As Duffield notes, relief aid agencies have to secure a negotiated access to conflict zones 
and this involves gaining the consent of warring parties or sectarian political entities.44 
The most important political effect of this double bind politicization of humanitarian aid 
is of course the de-politicization of the field. As Duffield puts it succinctly, what happens 
at the borders of the main bloc is only seen as a temporary phase in the transition to-
wards liberal democracy, and not as the emergence of new types of “socio- political 
formation adapted to exist on the margins of the global economy.”45 
One can now argue that the psychologization of humanitarianism serves precisely to 
legitimate the twofold politicization of humanitarian assistance. If, for example, human-
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 itarianism has traded the perspective of long-term development for a focus on relief in 
war zones, then it is the psycho-social discourse which provides the scientific support 
for this political shift. Signifiers such as development or underdevelopment, exploitation, 
social and economic convergence become obsolete and are replaced with psycho-social 
concepts such as capacity building, empowerment and resilience. On the other hand, when it 
comes to the politicization of aid on the local level,with NGOs seeking partnership with 
warring parties or sectarian political entities, the psychosocial discourse again serves to 
cover over the NGO‖s problematic political stance. Take, for example, Nordanger‖s plea 
for a “deep respect for the subjective elements of psychosocial coping and the contextu-
al limits within which these elements operate.”46 Concerning Tigray in Ethiopia, he ad-
vocates cooperation with the clergy and does so through mobilising a particularly very 
psychologising argument: 
Based on spiritual power alone, the church would not be able to preserve its au-
thority in the long run if its guidance were not meaningful in people‖s perception. 
Most probably, people themselves preserve and reinforce the power of the church 
and other discursive authorities, as these authorities give credence to coping 
strategies, which under the socio-economic conditions may seem to be the only 
viable option.47  
Faced with the choice of which side to take, Nordanger makes his decision on the basis 
of an essentialist psychology. His argument is that from a psychosocial point of view 
(thus invoking the idea of coping strategies) the support of the existing clerical power 
structures is to be preferred. The coalition between NGOs and local power bases is legit-
imated from a meta-psychological discourse. Claiming jurisdiction over what is local 
and genuine – and paradoxically articulating this in terms of the alleged universal cate-
gories of the psy-sciences – humanitarian aid is again thoroughly politicized. But again, 
this politicization entails a de-politicization in the field, as humanitarian aid, especially 
in its psycho-social turn, impedes and neutralizes the politicization of local people and 
groups.48 The conclusion is that the psycho-social turn of humanitarian aid, redoubling 
psychologization and de-psychologizaton, serves as the foundation of a humanitarian-
ism which is thoroughly politicized in exactly the same movement through which it de-
politicizes. What remains to be done however, is to place these paradoxical dynamics of 
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(de)psychologization and (de)politicization within a critique of biopolitical economy, or 
better, within a psycho-political economy. The psychologization of humanitarianism, 
that is, can show us how we can understand that subjectivity has taken centre stage in 
late-capitalist modes of production. 
The psycho-economics of psycho-social humanitarianism: skimming the battlefield and ghouling 
the disaster zone 
To understand the bio-political strategies and techniques of psycho-social humanitari-
anism let us take a closer look at an example, a peace education project for primary 
school children in Croatia. What we see here is a standard psycho-educational approach 
through which normativizing/normalizing psychological theory in introduced. It aims 
to get teachers and students to talk about “experiences of loss, separation and grief”, 
“normalizing and validating” the “emotional reactions and possible symptoms like 
flashbacks.”49 In the project‖s manual it is easy to detect the structure of psychologiza-
tion at work. For example, each group session starts with what one might call an aca-
demic interpellation:  
What we will be doing today: Observing our behaviour when we feel gloomy, an-
gry or furious; we are going to practise some techniques to manage our rage and 
to get rid of our feeling of anxiety and aggression.50 
This kind of introduction, repeated in each session, immediately prompts the children 
to adopt the position of observer, the position, that is, of the academic psychologist. 
This is then followed by some kind of activity, for example, role-play, drawing, singing 
etc., after which each session is concluded by a final round up: what have we learned? 
How did you feel doing this exercise? How did you feel when somebody invited 
you into the group or pushed you away from the group? How do you think a per-
son feels when he doesn‖t belong (…) and was thrown out of the group by every-
body? At the end let‖s explain why people gather in groups, why they form 
groups. Life needs to be secure and predictable. People like to be part of a group so 
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 that they can feel wanted and needed. What do you think, what other reasons are 
there51 
Here the model is: now that you know, how do you feel?52 Now you know how people as psy-
chological beings (are supposed to) think and feel, how do you – looking at yourself as a 
psychological being – think and feel? Doubtless the children will, more or less, comply 
and deliver the signifiers which have been introduced. In this way the psycho-
educational stance is the self-fulfilling prophesy par excellence. But what is more im-
portant here is that psycho-social techniques, via this (re)production of psychology, aim 
at the production of subjectivity. What have we learned today is a very mandatory inter-
pellation to produce a surplus of psychological feelings and cognitions which is then 
considered to be the very human condition laid bare: throbbing and pulsating psycho-
logical life. Questions such as how did you feel doing this exercise? are thus very coercive in 
their forcing the subject to offer his or her subjectivity to the therapist in charge of col-
lecting these surplus-values. 
The conclusion which forces itself here is is that we consider the therapist as the ul-
timate late-modern capitalist. The exploitation of the South suddenly thus emerges in a 
totally different light, as humanitarian aid appears as the very paradigm of psycho-
political economics. To understand this let us return to Pupavac‖s idea that the modern 
Western subject in this supposed post-ideological era lacks strong convictions and is 
subjected to social atomization and caught up in a therapeutization of the public dis-
course.53 For Pupavac this late-modern condition is, furthermore, responsible for the 
typical Hobbesian imagery of ubiquitous war and conflict through which the West pic-
tures the South:  
The notion of a continuum of violence underlying the rationale of psycho-social 
programmes overlooks how individuals in violent situations continue to evaluate 
what violence they consider acceptable or unacceptable. Effectively, the psycho-
social model resurrects the Hobbesian spectre of war of all against all as the per-
petuation of abuse of all against all.54 
Haunted by the Hobbesian imagery, the West considers conflicts in the third or fourth 
world as reflecting the natural struggle for power. It imagines the human condition laid 
bare, the human being stripped of its thin layer of cultural varnish. In others words, the 
West, de-politicized, de-ideologized and thus seemingly bereft of subjectivity, seeks 
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throbbing, pulsating life elsewhere. The psychologising of humanitarian aid testifies to 
the hole in our own psychology and our attempt to re-psychologise. The psychological 
gaze, launched inevitably from a point outside, a point beyond psychology, eventually 
attempts to produce psychology and subjectivity with the object of our interest, the ob-
ject of our care.  
The new humanitarian worker does not dispense food packets but, rather, 
knowledge, knowledge which pretends to cover the field of being, the very ontological 
sphere. Formerly the beneficiary only had to receive food and shelter. In an albeit lim-
ited way, he/she was still free to think and say what he/she wanted. The contemporary 
psycho-social approach is, in contrast, much more total. The receiver has to produce the 
right emotions, feelings and cognitions, collected by the third-party enabler of empow-
erment. If the old humanitarian worker could find job satisfaction out of a certain pa-
ternalism, the new humanitarian claims the unselfish and professional position of being 
the mere servant of a body of knowledge, dealing with the universals of mankind. But 
one should always be suspicious when the third-party position of mere enabler is 
claimed, for then the question becomes, what drives and what fuels the servant psy-
worker if not the production of emotions, the blossoming of resilience, the coming to 
terms with trauma, the letting go of racial prejudices, the beautiful tears? The image 
which imposes itself here is that of the humanitarian worker skimming the battlefields 
and ghouling the disaster zone for subjectivity; the one who gathers the broken people 
and brings them together in a tent to subject them to some therapeutic programme 
through which psychology can be reproduced. It is a rather distressing image in which, 
as Duffield calls them, “the best of people – the idealists, the rebels and the driven,”55 
while trying to escape the straitjacket of western de-ideologized life, become caught up 
in, to use Agamben‖s phrase, the production of bare life. It is thus that they maintain “a 
secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight.”56 
Duffield‖s borderlands thus have a quite specific function for the late-modern West; 
they feed the imagery of the other space, the non-liberal, non-democratic zone where 
warlords reign, where illegal trade runs rampant and any moment a tribal conflict can 
explode into a chaotic dispersed war. The borderlands function as a heart of darkness, 
offering a glimpse of the human being as it really is, beyond the thin layer of civiliza-
tion; the fantasmatic homo psychologicus driven by a rather simple interplay of genes and 
Darwinian principles, topped by some old cultural-religious idiosyncrasies (themselves 
nothing more than residues of phylogenetics). “Little do they know we are bringing the 
plague.” Thus runs the comment attributed to Freud when, together with Jung, he sailed 
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 to the USA for the first time.57 The crucial difference today is that it is the psychosocial 
worker himself, on board a military C-130, who is ignorant, unaware that he or she is 
carrying the plague, through his or her psycho-social and neutral professionalism. Or as 
Slavoj Žižek claims, the refusal of any higher Causes in the so called post-ideological era 
is the biopolitical move at its sharpest. As we consider the ultimate goal of our lives as 
life itself, this stance cannot but become caught up in the production of homo sacer, “the 
dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge.”58 The psy-worker, convinced he 
is merely tapping into scientifically proven universals, reduces the other to bare life, to 
homo sacer. 
The Hobbesian spectre of the war of all against all not only invokes how the fantasies 
of Academia are the basis for the bio-political technologies of global governance, but it 
also suggests that if one tries to understand the contemporary Leviathan one should no 
longer look for the social contract which constitutes the State, but for the learning con-
tract which establishes the sovereignty of Academia. The new sovereign wears Academ-
ic clothes and enrolls everyone in the psy-class. When empowerment, resilience and 
other signifiers from the academic psy-complex become the credo of humanitarian aid, 
aid becomes power, and this reveals how Academia comes to play the central role in the 
biopolitical and psycho-political economy. Not only does it deliver the rationale (the 
fantasies of the homo psychologicus) and assign the positions (turning everyone into a 
pupil of psychology) but it also economizes and capitalises the surplus-value of subjec-
tivity.  
Conclusions: psychology, subjectivity and money 
The psycho-social turn in humanitarianism reveals the structure of what Hardt & Negri 
call the biopolitical economy. Just as Hardt & Negri argue that there is no longer an out-
side to the logics of biopower, so we can argue that there is no longer an outside to psy-
chology. As a totalizing discourse, psycho-biopower is able to devour everything and spit 
it back out as psychology. However, globalisation does not effect a complete homogeni-
sation. According to Hardt & Negri, there are still determinate and concrete places of 
exploitation to be discerned. They argue that we “need to understand exploitation on 
the basis of the specific sites where it is located and specific forms in which it is orga-
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nized.”59 If one can regard psychologization as a central and specific form of exploitation, 
then the specific sites are Duffield‖s borderlands. The psychologization of the West is 
founded on a psychologization of its wastelands. That is where psycho-social humani-
tarian aid is caught up in the exploitation of subjectivity in a 
(de)psychologising/(de)politicizing matrix.  
This allows us to question Hardt & Negri‖s other central thesis; namely the idea of 
immaterial production. While Hardt & Negri rather unproblematically welcome the 
post-Fordist direct production of subjectivity and social relations – considering it an 
opportunity for direct and absolute democracy – our critique on psycho-social humani-
tarian aid forces us to question this rather optimistic view. Their basic idea is that post-
Fordist production is no longer aimed at the production of material goods but, rather, at 
the production of relationships and ultimately social life itself.60 Moreover, this produc-
tion is no longer exclusively owned by those who possess capital. Rather, for the first 
time in the history of capitalism, traditional ownership is bypassed by the multitude, 
producing communication, affective relationships and knowledges which can “can di-
rectly expand the realm of what we share in common.”61 Discerning here a road to abso-
lute democracy beyond any form of representation, Hardt & Negri take their distance 
from the Agamben‖s gloomier analysis and his claim for a more structural aporia in 
modern democracy. In particular, they reject Agamben‖s analysis in which Western de-
mocracy is underpinned by the close structural bond between sovereignty and the pro-
duction of bare life. Hence they refute Agamben‖s central example of the Nazi-camp as 
the paradigmatic site of production of bare life and homo sacer. For Hardt & Negri the 
motif of the camp embodies precisely the attempt to “destroy the enormous power that 
naked life could become and to expunge the form in which the new powers of produc-
tive cooperation of the multitude are accumulated.”62 Uncoupling bare life and sover-
eignty, Hardt & Negri claim that the production of social cooperation is “no longer the 
result of the investment of capital but rather an autonomous power, the a priori of every 
act of production.” 63 The direct production of subjectivity and social relations is, from 
Hardt & Negri‖s perspective, something with takes place outside the traditional capital-
ist scheme of creating surplus value through investment.  
But does not our analysis of psycho-social humanitarian aid contradict this? For to-
day‖s humanitarian camps reveal that the blossoming of subjectivity is not a spontane-
ous process, it is the result of a production process in which a surplus is created via the 
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 investment of academic psychology. Given the clearly de-psychologizing and de-
politicizing effects, contra Hardt & Negri, we do, thus, still end up with homo sacer. Na-
ked life is not raised up to the “dignity of productive power” as Hardt & Negri would 
have it.64 Rather it is the result of the expropriating inclusive/exclusive discourse of 
psychosocial humanitarian aid which reduces humanity to the disposable object of ex-
pert care. If Hardt & Negri claim that in the new global order there is no outside, they 
miss the fact that this is only realised by an Agambian inclusive exclusion of bare life. 
There psycho-social humanitarian aid reveals itself as one of the central modi operandi in 
the encapsulation, in an envagination-like movement, of the outside borderlands which 
it then capitalizes on by putting bare life into a sterile culture.  
However, we should also attempt to surpass the limits of Agamben‖s analysis. The dif-
ficulty with Agamben is that when he reintroduces sovereignty and couples it to the 
figure of homo sacer, he claims that in these late-capitalist times we are all potentially 
homines sacri. Here two things remain unclear with Agamben. The first is the question 
concerning the way in which we are all potentially homines sacri – as most examples giv-
en by Agamben and his commentators concern homo sacer as a peripheral figure and do 
not address the fact that everyone is, or can become, homo sacer. The second problem is 
that it is not clear how exactly we should think sovereignty in the new global order. If 
the Guantanamo-detainee or the “unlawfull combatant” can be connected in a straight-
forward way to the American president, as the sovereign who is above the law, it re-
mains unclear how, distinct from this, we should think of the sovereignty in the case of 
us all being potentially homines sacri. Our analysis of psycho-social humanitarian aid 
perhaps addresses both these issues. To begin with the question of sovereignty, instead 
of Hardt & Negri‖s multitude bypassing any representation or sovereignty, we found 
Academia as the instance of sovereignty involved in the production/appropriation of 
subjectivity. Perhaps we can put it this way; if feudal society had its king and modern 
democracy its state and representative democracy, then the multitude has Academia as 
its sovereign. It is, furthermore, exactly here that we are all potentially homines sacri, 
insofar as we become the object of the expert, caretaking, psychologising discourse, 
producing and expropriating our own subjectivity. Post-Fordism is not about the simple 
and direct production of subjectivity and social relations, today our subjectivity and 
social relations are monitored, controlled and managed as we find psy-workers every-
where, from kindergartens, through the workplace, right up to retirement homes. This 
is what a closer look at the psychosocial turn in humanitarian aid shows. The supposed-
ly spontaneous production of social relations and subjectivity in the West cannot but be 
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mirrored by a blunt psychologization and an alienating production of subjectivity at the 
borders and in the folds of the Empire. 
Here, at the end of this paper, we might perhaps be able to understand how in late-
modernity psychology, subjectivity and money became interrelated. For, does the anal-
ysis of psycho-social aid skimming the battlefields and ghouling the disaster zones not 
allow us to understand anew Walter Benjamin‖s assertion that humanity came to view 
its own destruction as a spectacle?65 Destruction at the borders of the Empire is what is 
supposed to unearth real and pulsating bare life, which has become the ultimate com-
modity in late-modernity. Benjamin‖s thesis means that the human being assumes a 
kind of extra-human observational position from which to contemplate humanity. Psy-
chologization is, then, today‖s hegemonic discourse which serves both as a tool to lay 
bare real life and to allow us to take the outsider position. To understand the im-
portance of the psychological in the spectacle, it suffices to look at psychotainment 
shows or reality TV in which the psychosocial plays a central role in the mediated pro-
duction of subjectivity; the latter being the central aspect of the spectacle. Just recall 
Survivor, in which, cynically, the hunger-trope is a central catalyst to produce the – pre-
formatted of course – subjectivities and Hobbesian social relations, a spectacle culminat-
ing in the pot of gold awaiting the participant who has proved to be the most complete 
and ingenious psychologoid. To understand this conflation of subjectivity, psychology 
and money, let us turn to Guy Debord:  
The spectacle is the other side of money: it is the general abstract equivalent of all 
commodities. Money dominated society as the representation of general equiva-
lence, namely, of the exchangeability of different goods whose uses could not be 
compared. The spectacle is the developed modern complement of money where 
the totality of the commodity world appears as a whole, as a general equivalence 
for what the entire society can be and can do. The spectacle is the money which 
one only looks at, because in the spectacle the totality of use is already exchanged 
for the totality of abstract representation. The spectacle is not only the servant of 
pseudo-use, it is already in itself the pseudo-use of life.66 
One is tempted here to replace spectacle with psychology. Psy-experts themselves often 
testify as to how psychology and money are interrelated, arguing, for example, that 
psycho-social programmes contribute to the nation‖s emotional wealth and social capi-
tal. In her analysis on the idea of emotional intelligence Burman thus rightfully con-
tends that, emotions have become “a vital commodity” in, for example, the context of 
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 elections.67 The analysis of psychosocial humanitarian aid suggests that the radical con-
clusion to make is that subjectivity has become the ultimate commodity, with psycholo-
gy as the other side of money. In psychosocial humanitarian aid, psychology reveals it-
self as, to put it in Debord‖s terms, the pseudo-use of life. Psychology aims at restoring 
the experience of the totality of the world, aims at making the society a totality once 
again. Psychology thus makes it possible to capitalise, to make profit at the very bor-
ders, at the waste-heaps of capitalism itself. Also, in the Marxist sense, psychology and 
money can be conflated, for psychology can be seen as a medium of exchange which 
permits a false equivalence between incommensurate objects. Furthermore, if anything 
can function as the framework for the commodity to be the congealing of social rela-
tions, then it is psychology. Psychology is the ultimate commodification, blurring out 
the social and economic contexts. This ossification of the social is realised by a whole 
array of psy-approaches, their seemingly wide theoretical difference withers away as we 
see that they all result in the objectification and the turning of subjectivity in a thing-
ness, be it genes, neurotransmitters, evolutionary patterns, emotions, skills, brain areas, 
childhood traumas, cognitions, rapid eye movements … each is a commodity in the psy-
cho-political economy.68 
The equation of psychology and money allows us to make one final step; namely, to 
understand how the Academy became the bank within this psycho-political economy. In 
Fordist times, the worker offered his or her labour-time to the market. Labour-time was 
a commodity which could be bought and sold on the marketplace. Thus, whilst working 
in a specific place for a given time, someone‖s labour-time could be sold/resold numer-
ous times on the stock market. In post-Fordism, labour-time has traded its hegemonic 
place with subjectivity - or, put differently, labour-time takes the form of subjectivity. 
While in Fordist times it is the bank which functions as the virtual gathering place of all 
value, now it is the Academy. In the new global order the human being (not only the 
labourer as such) offers its subjectivity on the market (or it is expropriated from it in 
other ways), where it becomes a commodity, not on the stock market, but in the market 
of the spectacle. If in industrialist times the market could not function without the 
bank, today the economics of subjectivity cannot function without Academia. The dif-
ference is that in Fordist times the labourer was forced to bring his labour time to the 
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market due to material dependency, in that he or she lacked access to or ownership of 
the means of production. In contrast, today it is important that everyone has access to 
the means of production and that is where everybody is subjected to the psycho-
educational discourse. In Fordism everybody had to become a client of the bank, now 
everybody has to be engaged in life-long-learning. While capitalism was the first mode 
of social organization to capitalise on the capacity to produce, late-capitalism is the so-
phistication of this: it is ultimately the capitalization of the very capacity to be.  
Epilogue 
The fact that the fundraising event Music For Life this paper started out with is also re-
ferred to as The Glass House is significant. To begin with, the link with psychotainment 
shows such as Big Brother is immediately clear; “The Glass House” offers us the specta-
cle of subjectivity.69 The gimic of starvation, as the DJ‖s have to survive on smoothies, car-
ries echoes of the psychotaintment show Survivor. The Glass House gives us a glimpse of 
bare subjectivity, bare life. Not only does donating money restore the balance of this 
access to another‖s subjectivity but, moreover, the cheering we do, the songs we sing, 
the good feelings we produce, all of this adds to the spectacle of emotions and subjectiv-
ity being economized and capitalised. However, the signifier “glass house” is peculiar in 
yet another way, as in the same city-quarter, just two streets away, the redlight district 
of the town centres around a street called the “glass alley”. Not only it is a typical 19th 
century street covered with a glass ceiling but, moreover, the ―glass‖ in glass alley refers 
to the practice of window prostitution. Does this not reveal some of the obscenity in-
volved in the fundraising event? Similar to the idea of food-porn – the erotisation of 
cooking activities – the glass house of the fundraising event shows us the bare psychol-
ogised subject with its emotions laid out in the open. Here humanitarianism turns out to 
be not only about disaster pornography70 but is also revealed as subjectivity- and psy-
cho-porn.  
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